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Life-cycle service is one of the characteristic aspects of the European Marriage Pattern. The 
majority of the children of labourers and peasants left the household of their parents during 
adolescence to  acquire  material  resources and skills  in  preparation of marriage.  Whilst  in 
service,  adolescents  could  save  part  of  their  wages.  As  most  of  them  worked  in  close 
geographical proximity to their family,  children in service were also a potential  source of 
income for their parents. This paper studies the nature, frequency and value of  remittances 
from farm servants to their parents in three countries during the eighteenth century. Important 
differences  emerge  from  this  comparative  study.  Farm  servants  in  Belgium  and  France 
frequently supported their parents financially with their earnings. In England parents could in 
most cases not rely on structural assistance from their unmarried adolescent children. I argue 
that property rights explain these differences. The absence of land that could be passed on 
through inheritance operated as a check to intergenerational solidarity.
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Introduction
In 1784,  fourteen  people  appeared  for  the  notary  in  the  village  of  Cérans  (north-
western France) to discuss the pension of an elderly farmer named Louis Porteboeuf. This 
retired farmer had no savings and was too old to earn a living. Porteboeuf turned to his kin 
group to come up with a solution for his poverty. The family members of Porteboeuf decided 
that all of them, from his children to his nieces and nephews, would found an annuity of 96 
livres per annum. The contract stipulated that each family member would contribute to the 
annual  pension  of  Porteboeuf  taking  into  account  the  ‘proximité  de  parenté’  (kinship 
proximity). Thus, the six children provided the bulk of the pension with 60 livres. The other 
family members each contributed 3 to 4 livres.  Four of the six children of Porteboeuf worked 
as servants when this contract was drawn up. (Fillon 1991, p. 41). All of the children agreed 
to remit part of their earnings, either as a farmer, gardener or servant, to their destitute father. 
This contract, by no means exceptional in this region, illustrates the importance of the family 
as a source of financial and material assistance in eighteenth-century rural France. The care of 
a  parent  however  could  seriously  undermine  the  saving  potential  of  a  servant.  Elizabeth 
Brooks for example worked 16 years as a servant when she left her London employer around 
1770 to take care of her blind mother in rural Sussex. By 1772 the care of the mother had 
absorbed nearly all of the savings of Elizabeth Brooks and she contemplated applying to the 
parish for  poor  relief  (Crawford 2010,  p.  55 and 251).  For  children  working as  servants, 
financial assistance to parents was not a simple formality. In agreeing to this support, these 
servants  not  only  accepted  a  lower  income,  but  also  delayed  the  process  of  resource 
accumulation that was expected from them in a neo-local pattern of household formation. 
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From the viewpoint of unmarried adolescents, balancing the expectations of family solidarity 
with pre-marital resource acquisition was neither easy nor straightforward.
In both these cases individual ambitions were sacrificed at the altar of filial assistance. 
These examples of servants in F rance and England indicate that part of the earnings from 
service were remitted to close kin.  They also highlight the importance of the family as a 
source of welfare for the elderly. In both cases remittances of unmarried children were part of 
the  solution  for  the  poverty  of  the  parents.  Viewed  from the  perspective  of  the  parents,  
unmarried children in service were clearly an asset in these two cases. The separation from 
the household did not necessarily result in severing all financial and material ties between 
them.  Louis  Porteboeuf  and  the  mother  of  Elizabeth  Brooks  experienced  the  hardships 
individuals could encounter resulting from the specific pattern of household formation and 
organization that characterized much of Western Europe (Laslett 1988). In both cases it was 
the family, and not the collectivity that came to the aid. To what extent these two cases are 
exemplary for rural societies in eighteenth-century rural Europe is one of the main themes of 
this paper.
This focus of this paper lies with the wages and earnings of farm servants and their  
financial relationships with their family members, especially their parents. I have opted for 
servants as a case study because they were able, at least in theory, to financially assist their 
parents. As I have shown in other research servants could save up 30 to 40 per cent of their  
cash wages (Lambrecht, 2012a, p. 5-10). It has been argued that these savings were used to 
acquire  the  necessary  financial  and material  resources  to  establish  a  new household.  My 
research  on  eighteenth-century  Flanders  however  also  exposed  another  story.  When  the 
accounts and contracts of farm servants with their employers are analyzed in detail, a picture 
emerges of servants as apparently altruistic family members. Servants allocated part of their 
earnings directly and indirectly to their family members, especially their parents. The picture 
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that emerged from these accounts was vastly different from what English historians write 
about the importance of remittances from children in service. Richard Smith in particular has 
argued on different occasions that service was not an institution conducive to the transfer of 
resources from children to their parents or family members (Smith 1984, p. 72 and Smith 
1981, p. 605-606). For John Hajnal too, service was a stage characterized by great financial 
independence from the parental  household (Hajnal,  1982, p.  474).  Not  all  historians have 
subscribed  to  this  view with  reference  to  England.  Bridget  Hill  for  example  argued  that 
remittances from servants to their parents were not that uncommon, although hard evidence 
was scarce (Hill  1996, p.  214-215).  Ilana Krausman Ben-Amos argued that  the life-cycle 
mobility of unmarried adolescents tended to strengthen rather weaken family ties, but that 
servants never became a regular source of assistance for the family (Krausman Ben-Amos 
1994, p. 165-170 and Krausman Ben-Amos 2000, p. 297). To what extent servants remitted 
part  of  their  earnings  to  their  family  members  can  also  be  framed  in  a  wider  debate 
concerning the role of kin members as sources of assistance. On this matter English historians 
have been divided. Some have argued that the collectivity,  especially welfare provisioning 
under  the  Old  Poor  Law,  was  more  important  than  the  family.  Other  shave  stressed  the 
importance of the family as the most generous and secure source of assistance (for a recent 
review see Tadmor 2010).  
This article introduces some comparative data on these issues. In the first section the 
potential of servants to remit part of their wages to their family members is assessed. The next 
two sections present the empirical results  of research on the importance and frequency of 
remittances  in  three  countries:  Belgium,  France  and  England.  This  comparative  exercise 
indicates that some differences can be observed between England and the two continental 
regions. In the last section I present a hypothesis about the origins of these different levels of 
kinship solidarity in eighteenth-century rural Europe. 
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Remittance potential and constraints
One of the main characteristics of service was the physical separation of children from 
the parental household. In general children entered service during their mid-teems when they 
were no longer net consumers. Employers would only house, feed and pay a cash wage to an 
adolescent if their productive capacities exceeded their human maintenance cost. This also 
implies that many children left the household just when they could become net contributors. 
Children that left for service were also migrants. Much of the population movement in pre-
industrial was the result of servants moving between different employers. Servants can thus 
be  viewed as  migrants  with  the  potential  to  remit  part  of  their  earnings  to  their  parents. 
However, there were a number of obstacles that needed to be overcome before an eighteenth-
century migrant could remit. Some of these practical problems were identified and addressed 
by Jeremy Bentham in the late eighteenth century.  Like many others after 1750, Bentham 
identified intra-family transfers in general and wage remittances from children to parents in 
particular as a possible alternative to public welfare among the labouring poor. Unlike many 
others however,  Bentham also realized that there were a number of practical  obstacles to 
transferring  small  sums  of  money.  As  he  wrote  in  1796,  ‘The  poor  man’s  pittance  is  
immovable. A dutiful child, who has quited his native cottage for employment, might send  
(one should think), a few shillings, as he could save and spare them, to assist an aged parent  
in his  struggles against incidence […]. No, it  is not to be done.’  (Bentham 1796, p. 90). 
Bentham claimed that many children living and working at some distance from their parents 
could assist them, but in practice never did. Especially the high costs attached to sending 
small  amounts of money across the country and the lack of geographical coverage by the 
postal services obstructed such transfers. To overcome these problems and reduce transport 
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costs,  Bentham proposed  to  erect  ‘remittance  offices’  attached  to  his  houses  of  industry 
(Bentham 1796, p. 90; Bentham 1798, p. 490-494). The absence of these types of financial  
institutions, that facilitated the exchange of small sums of money between kin-members who 
were geographically separated, resulted in higher levels of dependency on external support 
according to Bentham. Lack of opportunity rather than willingness or financial margins to 
assist kin-members explained the absence of these transfers. Bentham’s observations on the 
difficulties  to  transfer  small  payments  between distant  parishes  during the late  eighteenth 
century are confirmed by recent research on the practical problems of he administration of 
out-relief under the Old Poor Law. Even until the early decades of the nineteenth century 
well-organised parishes and their overseers encountered substantial difficulties in transferring 
money to out-residents. The absence of a reliable infrastructure to transmit small payments 
between parishes has been identified by Steve King as one of the great logistical problems of 
outdoor relief to sojourners (King 2005, p 167-173). In the Dutch Republic skippers of small 
canal boats transported small parcels of cash, but to what extent labourers used this transport 
service is unknown (de Vries 1981, p. 128-129). 
Not all categories of labourers experienced these technical difficulties in transferring 
money to their family. Especially those involved in long-distance labour migration had access 
to advanced financial technology to remit part of their wages. For English naval seamen such 
opportunities already existed in the first half of the eighteenth century. If they appointed an 
attorney, they could allocate part of their earnings to people of their choice. However, costs 
and attorney fees were so high that very few very few seamen made use of this opportunity to  
assist their family members from their wages. The Navy Act of 1758 altered this system and 
ensured that sailors could send money almost free of charge (Gradish 1978, p. 46-67; Lin 
1997, p. 31-91). Employees of the Dutch East India Company also had the opportunity at their 
disposal to remit part of their wages. Through a system of so-called  maandbrieven sailors 
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could send part of their annual wages to any person of their choice (van der Heijden and van 
den Heuvel 2007, p. 299-301). In the Austrian Netherlands dependents of sailors employed by 
the Ostend Compagny could equally receive advance payments on the wages of their family 
members working overseas (Parmentier 2002, p. 35). Most of the labourers in pre-industrial 
Europe did not have these cheap advanced financial instruments at their disposal to transfer 
small sums of money over short distances. It is important to stress the lack of this type of 
institutions in many part of rural Europe before the nineteenth century as this could restrict 
migrants  in  their  options  and  abilities  to  assist  their  family  members.  If  offspring  were 
working as servants at  some distance from home,  parents were less likely to receive  any 
material  assistance  from  them.  This  was  already  suggested  by  Laslett  in  his  original 
formulation  of  the  nuclear  hardship  hypothesis.  Close geographical  proximity  to  kin  was 
identified as one of the pre-conditions of family welfare (Laslett  1988, p. 157-158). Also, 
sufficient  money  had  to  circulate  to  enable  employers  to  make  cash  payments  to  their 
labourers  (Muldrew  2007).  In  the  eighteenth  century  the  availability  of  cash  gradually 
expanded,  so  in  theory  labourers  could  assist  their  family  members  from  their  surplus 
earnings with coin (Muldrew and King 2004, p. 159-160 and Lambrecht 2007, p. 93-97). 
Remittances  can  only  take  place  in  the  eighteenth  century  when  a  number  of 
conditions  are  met.  First,  wage earners  need to  be working close to  the residence  of  the 
potential beneficiaries of remittances to overcome the problem of costly transfers of cash or 
goods in kind. Secondly, wage earners should have a surplus income. If wages are so low that 
they will only maintain the labourer, there are no financial margins to assist family members. 
In  pre-industrial  Europe  at  least  one  occupational  group  meets  these  two  requirements. 
Servants in husbandry were a highly mobile group. Farm servants moved frequently, but did 
so in most cases over relatively limited distances. The annual turnover of servants was high, 
most of them changed employers after one or two years of service, but geographical mobility 
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was restricted. Anne Kussmaul has defined the mobility of farm servants as ambiguous as 
they moved often but within narrow a geographical range (Kussmaul 1981a). Most of the 
servants thus stayed close to their parental home. In terms of remuneration servants enjoyed a 
particular status. They were housed and fed by their employer and received a cash wage on 
top of their wages in kind. It has been estimated that this cash wage represented some 20 tot 
40 per cent of the total wage (Whittle 2005, p. 95-96 and Lambrecht 2012a, p. 4-5). In theory 
a large part of this cash wage could be saved and in practice many servants did (Lambrecht 
2012a, p. 9-10). Some of these savings contributed to a marriage fund that would enable the 
servant to start a new household. For parents, children in service were a potential source of 
additional income as most of them were working close to home and received a wage that was 
higher than their human maintenance cost. 
Continental altruism
Farm servants  have  left  very  few  written  records  from which  we  can  infer  their 
financial  trajectories.  Some information about the remittance behaviour of servants can be 
extracted from the account books of their employers. Many farmers in Flanders kept detailed 
notes about labour expenditure on their farm. Although few have survived, they are highly 
instructive about the relationship between the servant and their wider kin group.  When labour 
contracts  were drafted,  parents  of  servants  are  frequently mentioned  as  beneficiaries  of  a 
range of goods and services. Kin members of servants also appear in deductions and advance 
payments on wages recorded by their employers. 
The account books of farmers in Flanders indicate that the entry of a child into service 
was also an occasion for parents to secure income for themselves. In many account books, kin 
members, and parents in particular, appear in the labour contracts. Next to the cash wage and 
payments in kind to the servants, some contracts also specify payments for the parents. These 
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payments, as the account of a late eighteenth-century farmer indicates, consisted of various 
types of goods and services (see table below).
 
[insert Table 1 here]
Overall,  one third of the contracts listed in this account book contain references to 
benefits in kind for parents. These payments to parents mostly consisted of cheap foodstuffs 
(rye and potatoes). Parents also secured land fro themselves. In this particular context land 
refers  to  the  right  of  the  parents  to  cultivate  potatoes  (free  of  charge)  on  land  that  was 
exploited by the employer  of their children.  These plots of land were very small  (ranging 
between 0.026 and 0.037 ha). Servants also secured coal and free transport services for their 
parents. Parents of servants thus gained access to the horse team of the employer of their  
children. Similar arrangements between servants, employers and parents also abound in other 
account books (for what follows see Lambrecht 2009, p. 638-643 and Lambrecht 2012a, p. 
13-16). A maid on the farm of Gerard de Wulf in the village of Eke negociated a wage of 3 £ 
Flemish per annum and 2 ‘meukens’ (or 28 litres) of rye for her mother. On another farm, the 
father of a maid called Marianne De Mey secured 1 barrel of rye for himself when he hired 
out his daughter. The parents of Joannes Neerinck received some pieces of clothing and a dish 
of pork meat. When Pieter D’Hont hired himself as a servant in 1774 he managed to secure 
the free use of a team of horses for one day for his mother.  Some arrangements between 
parents and children in the context of employment were not explicitly mentioned in the labour 
contract. A government decree from 1740 reports that servants also tried to secure gleaning 
rights  -  most  likely  for  their  parents  -  on  the  fields  of  their  employer  when  they  hired 
themselves (Placcaertboeck van Vlaenderen 1763: p. 829-830). Labour contracts recorded in 
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farm account books thus probably underestimate the range of goods and services servants 
obtained for their parents.
These benefits in kind probably had repercussions on the wage servants received from 
their employer. From the viewpoint of the employer, benefits in kind were part of the wage of  
the  servant  and  would  thus  affect  other  remuneration  components.  Most  probably,  these 
benefits  in  kind for  parents  resulted  in  a  lower cash wage for  the servant.  Indirectly  the 
servant thus remitted part of his wage to his parents. The monetary value of these benefits for 
parents is usually not recorded in the accounts books. A comparison between the market value 
of some of these benefits  and the cash wage of the servant  indicates  that  these were not 
insignificant. For one servant, receiving a cash wage of  720 stuiver per annum, the value of 
the 18 rods of potato land secured for his parents amounted to 82 stuiver or 11 per cent of his 
cash wage. For another servant the market value of the potato land was worth more than one-
fourth  of  his  cash  wage.  From  other  account  books  we  know  that  farmers  charged  the 
equivalent of 13 daily wages of an adult labourer for the use of horse and cart during one day 
(Lambrecht 2012a, p. 14). Servants would most likely have received a lower cash wage if 
they secured benefits  for their  parents and consequently,  this  would have influenced their 
earning and saving potential. 
Some farmers  not  only recorded the labour  contracts,  but  also kept  detailed  notes 
about  the  expenditure  patterns  of  their  workforce.  Most  employers  allowed their  servants 
advance  payments  on their  wages.  To avoid  conflicts  these  payments  were recorded  and 
settled against the annual wage at the end of the service term. From these entries in account 
books it is possible to reconstruct the spending patterns of servants. Interestingly, parents of 
servants frequently appear in these expenses. Servants sent cash, food and clothing to their  
parents and also paid different services from their wages. The value of all these goods and 
services were deducted from the wages of the servants. In 1720 a maid spent 72 per cent of 
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her cash wage on transfers to her parents. These remittances represented between 35 and 40 
daily wages of a male labourer. Especially with younger servants (cow herds) these transfers 
to parents appear frequently. In some cases recipients of goods in kind were not specified, but 
most likely these items were destined for family members. Farmers fed their servants, so in 
theory  servants  did  not  have  to  purchase  any  food.  The  numerous  references  to  basic 
foodstuffs  (rye,  potatoes  and  pork)  in  the  accounts  of  servants  suggest  that  these  were 
allocated to family members. Servants also indirectly financed the proto-industrial activities 
of their  parents.  Daniel  Spinsemaille  for example  purchased flax seed from his employer 
destined to be grown on the fields of his parents. The accounts of servants also indicate that 
yarn and processed flax were transferred to the parents. Although the vast majority of these 
transfers were vertical,  from children to their parents, some examples can be found where 
money  was  transferred  to  other  kin  members.  Jan  Soubrie  for  example  transferred 
approximately  one  third  of  his  cash  wage  to  his  uncle  in  1722.  In  1751  a  maid  named 
Petronella  Vereecke  spent  one  fourth of  her  cash wage to  pay for  the  burial  and funeral 
expenses of her deceased sister (Lambrecht 2012a, p. 14-15). As was the case with benefits in 
kind, servants partly financed the household of their parents with the wages earned in service.
Farm servants in France display similar remittance behaviour. Here too, references to 
payments  from servants  to  their  families  can  be  frequently  encountered  in  farm account 
books. Parents appear as recipients of benefits in kind given to farm servants. A farm servant 
in Saint-Eutrope (Agenais) for example received a cash wage of 15 livres per year and some 
pieces of clothing in 1737, but also 228 litres of grain and a sack of vegetables (Tholin 1880, 
p. 384). In the same region a servant received two sacs or 218 litres of grain on top of his cash 
wages in 1756 (Charbonneau 1970, p. 169). Although no explicit references are made to the 
fact  that  this  food  was  destined  for  the  parents,  it  is  highly  unlikely  that  the  servants 
themselves would have consumed this grain. In northern France it was not uncommon for 
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farm servants to receive flax seed on top of their wages. In some cases the parents of the 
servants are explicitly recorded as beneficiaries of this flax seed.1 Parents receiving benefits in 
kind from the employers of their children in service seems an almost universal practice in the 
Alsace region. As in Flanders parents received a variety of foodstuffs (wine and grain), but 
could also access to the working capital of the employers of their children free of charge. 
Thus,  in  the  1780’s  and 1790’s  parents  could  use the horses,  ploughs and carts  of  large 
farmers where they had placed their offspring in service. For the French historian Jean-Michel 
Boehler  these frequent  indirect  remittances  testify to  the strong family ties  in this  region 
(Boehler 1994, p. 1048-1053). Parents also used the wages of their children as a kind of cash 
deposit on which they could draw from time to time. In the region of Boulogne parents used 
the wages of their  children in service to purchase grain and textiles from their  employers 
(Hamy 1906, p. 354). The mother of a servant in Droyes used the wages of her son in service 
to obtain an unspecified amount of merchandises from his employer (Arnouet 1962, p. 169). 
In northern France too the cash wages of farm servants were sometimes almost completely 
absorbed by goods and services delivered to the parents of servants (de Calonne 1920, p. 
270).  On the  farm of the Chartier  family (north of Paris),  male  servants  who were hired 
locally received some 13 per cent of their cash wage in kind (especially foodstuffs) between 
1737  and  1746  (Moriceau  and  Postel-Vinay  1992:  p.  252).  This  strongly  suggests  that 
adolescents working on this farms assisted their family members living nearby.  In some cases 
parents could rely on periodical cash transfers from their children. The wages of François 
Dupuy for example were paid in three-monthly instalments to his father in 1767 and used to 
pay taxes. In most cases parents were the main beneficiaries of these remittances, but also 
brothers  and sisters  are  sometimes  recorded  (Gutton  1981,  p.  112-114).  In  some  regions 
tradition allegedly prescribed that the wages of children placed in service flowed back to the 
1 See the multiple references in the account book of Pierre Antoine Le Blond (1759-1784), held at the Archives  
Départementales Pas-de-Calais, Serie E, depot 585 II 8.
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parental household. Thus a 1765 memoir on the economic situation of rural households in the 
Gévaudan reported: ‘When children reach a certain age, the father places them as servants and 
receives almost all of their wages’ (translated from Claverie and Lamaison 1982, p. 85). 
The most detailed evidence testifying to the importance of these remittances can be 
gleaned from the account book of the family Flahaut in Labourse (northern France).  This 
family exploited a large farm (exact size unknown, but in 1811 three plough servants were 
employed) and kept a detailed record of payments to their workforce. The detailed notes about 
the wages of servants reveal that remittances to parents were almost a general rule. Between 
1812 and 1830 servants allocated on average one fifth of their cash wages to their parents. 
The intensity of these remittances varied from one year to another. In some years no cash 
transfers from servants to parents were recorded. In years of high food prices, the intensity of 
these remittances could rise spectacularly. In 1816 for example female servants on this farm 
remitted 26 per cent of their wages to their parents. The following year, when the price of rye 
had risen by some 42 per cent, the volume of remittances rose to 53 per cent of their cash 
wages. The maximum share of the cash wages flowing back to the parents was 44 and 53 per 
cent respectively for male and female servants. Also, male servants frequently purchased peat 
and coal from their employer. These purchases should probably also be added to the volume 
of remittances (Hubscher 1969, p. 391-396; see also Heywood 1988, p. 37). The detailed 
accounts  of  this  farm clearly  illustrate  that  remitting  money was  very  common for  farm 
servants.  This  suggests  that  children  working  as  farm  servants  were  in  most  cases  still 
strongly integrated into the household economy of their parents. 
The importance  of  servants for  their  parents’  material  wellbeing can be illustrated 
directly from the wage books of farms employing servants. However, there is also indirect  
evidence  that  testifies  to  the  important  role  of  unmarried  offspring  for  the  household 
economies  of  the  peasantries  of  France.  The  significance  of  remittances  from unmarried 
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children is illustrated by the specific measures adopted concerning the welfare of soldiers 
families at the end of the eighteenth century. Hundreds of thousands of young unmarried men 
were separated from their families during the early years of the French Revolution. In 1792 a 
set  of  measures  was  introduced  to  compensate  households  for  the  loss  of  income  they 
sustained following the enlistment of their children. This was measure was intended to reduce 
resistance to military enrolment. The system of family allowances operated between 1792 and 
1796. It has been estimated that the French military effort resulted in the recruitment of some 
800000 to 900000 men in 1794. This large-scale conscription resulted in labour shortages 
(and rising wages) in the countryside (see the numerous references in Festy 1947). The effects 
however stretched further. Many households were deprived of their productive and income-
generating  capacities.  As  conscription  targeted  young  male  adolescents  in  particular, 
households were stripped of part of their labour power and income. A report of the French 
Minister  of  Interior  estimated  that,  on  average,  one  unmarried  adolescent  cared  for  the 
material needs of two family members. It was calculated that circa 1.6 million individuals 
would need to be compensated throughout France (Thuillier 1988, p. 488). The French state 
thus  acknowledged  that  the  enlistment  of  young  men  had  a  profound  impact  on  the 
households of the French rural labouring classes. To neutralize the effects of the conscription 
on unmarried young men,  the French state  decided to  compensate  poor families  for their 
material losses (see table below). 
[insert Table 2 here]
In 1792, compensation was restricted to those who had enrolled voluntarily into the 
army.  One year  later,  compensations  were  extended  to  all  soldiers.  From 1793 orphaned 
brothers and sisters from also received benefits. Parents could also claim benefits if they were 
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younger than 60 and prove that they were poor or incapable to work. The value of these 
pensions rose between 1792 and 1794 to compensate for the galloping inflation. What is most 
striking however, is that the compensation for service in the army extended far beyond the 
traditional categories of wives, and children and widows. For example, the father and mother 
of a farm servant enlisted in the army would receive a joint annual pension of 200 livres in 
1793 and 1794. If they had two sons in the army,  the pension could be doubled.  French 
welfare schemes for soldiers clearly reflect the importance of unmarried children for their 
parents. This also becomes apparent when the distribution of these pensions is analyzed in 
detail.  In  the  village  of  Bassens  (near  Bordeaux)  75  enlisted  soldiers  entitled  91  family 
members to relief or compensation. The vast majority of the assistance received from family 
members came from unmarried sons: 68 out of 91 received assistance because they had a son 
or grandson in the army (Valette 1989, p. 323 ). The state compensated households for the 
hardship brought upon them as a result from military conscription. In doing so, the state thus 
officially  recognized  that  unmarried  adolescents  (such  as  farm  servants)  were  an 
indispensable part of the household economies and a secure source of income.  
These transfers to the parents, either as benefits in kind or subtracted from the cash 
wages, may not all appear that substantial individually. We should however take into account 
that  the  transfers  that  can  be  traced  through  account  books  of  employers  probably 
underestimate the true extent and value of cash, goods and services that flowed back to the 
parental  household.  Servants  also  frequently  received  unspecified  cash  advances  on  their 
wages.  In  these  cases  it  is  not  possible  to  determine  what  servants  did  with  these  cash 
advances. It is possible these were also remitted to the parents. More importantly however, 
parents would have more than one child working as a servant. If the transfers of multiple 
children in service could be cumulated, their importance for the parental household economy 
could be more substantial. The most important argument pleading for the importance of these 
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transfers for  the household economy of  the parents  can be simply derived from the very 
existence of these transfers. If parents were able to support themselves without the aid of their 
offspring in service, we would simply not encounter these remittances in the account books of 
the  employers  of  farm  servants.  This  strongly  suggests  that  part  of  the  earnings  of  the 
servants, either indirectly or directly, constituted a welcome addition to the household income 
of parents.  As such servants in rural  France and Belgium were economic assets  for their 
parents.  Although they were physically  separated from their  parents,  intense and frequent 
flows of material resources can be reconstructed. 
Some insight  into the  relative  value  of  these  remittances  can be obtained  through 
comparison with other types  of assistance.  In Belgium each parish was equipped with an 
institution that administered poor relief to the local inhabitants. These poor boards collected 
and administered charitable  donations and distributed them to needy parish members (see 
Vanhaute and Lambrecht 2011). A comparison between the material assistance dispensed by 
these welfare institutions with the cash wages of servants can be highly instructive. Indirectly 
this  comparison  informs  us  about  the  potential  and  relative  importance  of  family  and 
institutional  welfare.  For a group of Flemish  villages  called  ‘The Eight  Parishes’ welfare 
resources and wages of servants working in these parishes can be reconstructed in great detail. 
Reliable information is available for each of these parishes on the number of servants, their 
wages and poor relief expenditure around 1700. Data about the resources of poor relief boards 
relate to their annual income. In other words, the annual income represents the maximum 
these institutions could distribute among the parishioners (see table below).
[insert Table 3 here] 
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The results of these calculations indicate that the cash wages earned by servants in 
these parishes vastly exceeded the income of poor relief institutions. Important variations can 
be  observed  between  the  parishes.  Relative  to  the  wages  of  servants,  the  poor  board  of 
Woesten was not very richly endowed. The combined wages of servants were almost 50 times 
higher than the income of the poor board. In Elverdinge the poor board disposed of more 
income, but this still only represented some 10 per cent of the wages of servants. In general  
the assistance these relief institutions could offer was dwarfed by the value of the cash wages 
of servants.  This clearly indicates that, viewed from the perspective of parents, children in 
service were a potentially more generous source of assistance than local poor relief boards. 
The data in this  table  also indicate  that poor relief  expenditure was low compared to the 
earning capacity of unmarried adolescents working as servants. If each individual servant in 
these villages remitted 8 per cent of their cash wage to their parents, this sum equalled the 
annual  poor  relief  expenditure  in  these  communities.  It  should  be  stressed  that  these 
calculations are based on the cash wages of servants. The cash wage only represented between 
30 and 40 per cent of total remuneration. When the value of board is taken into account, the  
relative value of poor relief expenditure drops to less than 5 per cent. In the late eighteenth 
century, similar ratios between servants wages and poor relief expenditure prevailed in this 
region. The value of poor relief expenditure relative to servants’ wages was 8 per cent in 1795 
(Lambrecht  2012a,  p.  19).  These  calculations  strongly  suggest  that  the  family,  and  in 
particular  unmarried  children  in  service,  could  offer  more  generous  assistance  than  local 
collective welfare institutions. Such a discrepancy between the wages of servants and public 
welfare  provisions  probably  also  occurred  in  eighteenth-century  rural  France.  Whilst  in 
Belgium all parishes had a poor relief agency, many French rural parishes did not even have 
any  funds  available  for  welfare  purposes  (Hufton  1974,  p.  131-176;  Chapalain-Nougaret 
1989, p. 358-364). The lack of structural welfare support in rural France (combined with the 
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paucity of their resources) suggests that the wages of servants were probably more important 
for rural households than in Belgium. 
English Individualism 
As noted  earlier,  historians  working on the  institution  of  service  in  England have 
stressed the relative financial independence of farm servants from their family members. A 
number of historians of the institution of farm service in eighteenth-century England have 
addressed the issue of remittances directly.  The work of Ann Kussmaul  has revealed that 
these transfers were certainly not inexistent. Evidence of remittances from children in service 
to  their  parents  can  be  found  in  eighteenth-century  farm  account  books.  However,  as 
Kussmaul notes, these references pertain almost exclusively to the youngest segment of the 
servant population. Especially young servants such as cowherds remitted part of their wages 
to their parents (Kussmaul 1981b, p. 76). Keith Snell also unearthed evidence of remittances 
from children working as servants. However, as he notes, these arrangements were limited in 
time. Parents of servants could only expect a year’s wage at best during the start of the servant 
career of the child. Examples of such arrangements that lasted longer are scarce (Snell 1985, 
p. 347-348). For English labouring households, the importance of remittances can also be 
reconstructed  using  the  budgets  of  labouring  household  collected  by  David  Davies  and 
Frederic Eden in the late eighteenth century (Sokoll 1991). Most of the household budgets 
collected by Davis and Eden refer to households with many young children. Although no 
research has been undertaken to verify if the composition of the households in these budgets 
are representative of the household situation of agricultural labourers, the impression arises 
that most of the household in these budgets are young households with a high number of non-
productive members. Households of labourers that had children working away from home as 
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servants or apprentices are scarce in these collections of budgets. In the budget collection of 
Eden three households are listed that had children working outside the parental household. In 
none of these household budgets remittances from children working as servants were recorded 
as a source of income. The household headed by 39-year  old carter had a daughter of 15 
working as a servant  girl  in Manchester,  but there are no traces  of remittances  from this 
daughter  in  the  calculation  of  the  total  earnings.  A  boy  of  16  working  as  a  servant  in 
Monmouth (Wales) also did not assist his parents from his wages. Even when a household 
had multiple children working as servants, no income was derived from their activities. A 
labourer  in  Streatly  (Berkshire)  had three  children  working as  servants,  but  these  do not 
appear in the detailed list of earnings of this household.  In this household annual expenditure 
exceeded income by some 18 £ . They managed to make end meets by child allowances and 
rent subsidies from the parish and charitable donations in kind. The household deficit could 
have  been  greatly  reduced  if  these  children  in  service,  who  jointly  would  have  earned 
somewhere between 15 and 20 £ per annum, had remitted part of their wages to their parents. 
But, as the budget informs us, they choose not to do so (Eden 1797, II, p. 15-16, 359, 448).  
Davies addressed this lack of family assistance by servants explicitly in his comments on the 
household economy of the labouring poor. In his analysis of the causes of increasing reliance 
on parish assistance in the late eighteenth century Davies pointed the finger to servants. Like 
many others, he blamed unmarried adolescents for not being frugal whilst in service. As a 
result, their financial means were rapidly exhausted after marriage. He also added that few 
servants used their wages ‘for the relief of infirm parents or poor relations’ (Davies 1795, p. 
58).  Davies  confirms  the  findings  of  historical  research  of  Kussmaul  and  Snell  on  farm 
servants and remittances. On the basis of the evidence collected by Davies and Eden other 
historians have also argued that remittances from children working away from home were a-
typical of eighteenth-century England (Williamson 1990, p. 72). The absence of remittances 
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to parents and family members has also been noted for unmarried immigrant women working 
in northern English urban industries during the nineteenth century (Gordon 2005, p. 57-59).
The relative lack of references to remittances in English sources is confirmed by data 
that enable us to measure the scale and intensity of remittances of other occupational groups 
in with more accuracy. As noted above, English naval seamen could remit part of their wages 
to their family members. In 1758 legal formalities and costs were reduced to stimulate sailors 
to assist their relatives. The effects of this new legislation were not impressive as few sailors 
made use of this opportunity to remit wages and the sums were quite low. On 72 Navy ships 
in 1759 only 3 per cent of the sailors made remittances. Pay books indicate that the value of 
these transfers only amounted to a meagre 5.6 per cent of their net pay (Rodger 1986, p. 134 
and 366).  
The absence of remittances as a source of family welfare was a theme that was also 
explicitly addressed by eighteenth-century poor relief reformers. One of the most interesting 
proposals to remedy this situation was conceived by Thomas Haweis. Haweis, rector of a 
small  parish  in  Northamptonshire,  was  one  the  few  who  addressed  the  problem  of 
intergenerational transfers and the role children in service could play in alleviating the poverty 
of their parents (Haweis 1788). His pamphlet is one of the many hundreds of publications that 
addressed the causes and consequences of inflating relief expenditure during the last decades 
of the eighteenth century. His publication stands out from other poor law pamphlets as his 
calculations were based on actual data about poor relief expenditure and earnings by various 
categories of labourers in his parish. Also, Haweis acknowledged that there was an objective 
need for public relief and he did not attempt to cut relief expenditure. The main project of 
Haweis dealt with an alternative method of raising financial means to aid the poor. Like many 
others, Haweis suggested a compulsory contribution scheme as a partial replacement for the 
parish rates. Both the large tenant farmers and the active labouring population (‘industrious 
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classes’) should co-finance a parish fund from which the poor and elderly could be aided. In 
his own words, the best method to relief the poor was ‘to engage them, whilst in health and  
strength,  to assist in raising a fund for the supply of their own necessities in the hour of  
calamity’ (Haweis 1788, p. 4). In many ways his proposal fits into a more general movement 
towards  self-help  schemes  such  as  friendly  societies  and  popular  saving  banks.  Haweis 
suggested that different categories of labourers could contribute between 2.7 and 8.3 per cent 
of their wages and that farmers contributed the equivalents of 5 per cent of the annual rental 
value of their holdings. His calculations, taking into account the actual social structure and 
relief expenditure in his parish in the 1780’s, showed that this project could raise sufficient  
means  to  finance  all  welfare  needs.  This  alternative  method  of  raising  welfare  resources 
basically extended the burden of raising welfare resources down the social scale and implied a 
lowering of the contribution of the traditional rate-payers. In this new scheme the labouring 
population  would  raise  between  one-fourth  and  one-third  of  all  welfare  resources.  With 
reference to the contributions of the labouring population, Haweis stressed the potential of 
unmarried labourers who were boarded with their employers (such as farm servants) to pay 
these compulsory taxes. Farm servants were taxed at the highest rates of 5.6 to 8.3 per cent as 
they incurred no large expenses for rent or raising a family. As such, the tax rate for servants 
proposed by Haweis illustrates the high saving potential  of this group of labourers in this 
particular stage of their life-cycle. It was only when farm servants could prove that they were 
already remitting part of their earnings to their aged or poor relatives that they were charged 
the lower rate. This project, although probably never executed and not that widely dispersed, 
does indirectly reveal some issues about the nature of the relations between adolescents in 
farm service and their parents. In his view, remittances of servants to their parents and parish 
assistance were operating like communicating vessels. If servants did not financially assist 
their parents at a time when their saving potential was the highest, it was likely that the latter 
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were forced to turn to public welfare to make ends meet. His project can also be read as an 
attempt  to  introduce  the  type  of  family  solidarity  that  was  characteristic  of  many  rural 
societies in France and Belgium. 
Haweis’ book also fits into a wider discourse about the lack of filial solidarity and assistance 
in  eighteenth-century  Poor  Law  pamphlet  literature.  Many  critics  of  the  Old  Poor  Law 
frequently  referred  to  the  failure  of  the  English  labouring  family  to  assist  their  needy 
members.  They argued that provisions under the Old Poor Law had replaced and weakened 
the  traditional  and natural  ties  between  generations.  In  their  view,  English  individualism 
among the labouring classes was strongly connected to generous relief under the Old Poor 
Law. According to Henry Kames the relaxation of  ‘mutual affection between parent and  
child’ was one of the negative effects of the Old Poor Law. He deplored that filial assistance 
had to be enforced by law (Kames 1775, p. 39-41).  Hanway equally regretted that ‘ there is  
not more pride among the sons and daughters of the poor, to prevent the aged parent from  
being a burthen to the parish’ (Hanway 1774, p. 104). Around the middle of the eighteenth 
century  Alcock argued  that  poor  relief  expenditure  could  be  lowered if  the  law of  1601 
concerning filial assistance was more strictly enforced (Alcock 1752, p. 63).  The allegedly 
cold and harsh attitude of children towards their parents is exemplified in the work of William 
Keir: ‘The common language of children in these parts of the country now is: What occasion  
have we to deprive ourselves of any indulgencies, for the purpose of supporting our aged  
parents  ?  The parish  is  bound to  provide  for  them’  (Keir  1807:  p.  155).   Some authors 
contrasted the English experience of individualism with the other regions.  Jonas Hanway, 
who had travelled extensively across Europe, praised Portuguese and Russian urban labourers 
for assisting their elderly parents. He claimed that in England, contrary to other European 
regions, ‘old people are thrown on the parochial charity, whose children might provide for  
them, but do not’ (Haway 1774, p. 154-156). Differences in the balance between family and 
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institutional welfare were also illustrated by direct references to the remittances of servants. In 
a description of the welfare institutions of the Scottish county of Galloway, the author stressed 
the importance of the family as a source of assistance: ‘It is no unusual occurrence to find  
even servant  girls,  struggling  with difficulties,  and oeconomically  sparing a part  of  their  
wages to keep their parents from the dishonour they attach to receiving aid from the poor  
box’. He meaningfully added: ‘How different is the case in England !’ (Smith 1810, p. 338-
339). Another author stated that under the Old Poor Law farm servants did not assist their 
family members from their wages (Z.A. 1838, p. 136).
Although  such  contemporary  characterisations  about  the  lack  of  intergenerational 
solidarity  among  the  English  labouring  poor  should  be  treated  with  reservations,  it  is 
important to stress that these claims mirror the lack of remittances we can observe in other 
sources. Both the discourse about filial responsibility and especially the actual data from farm 
account  books  and  household  budgets  suggest  that  remittances  from  servants  and  other 
migrants  to  their  parents  were uncommon in eighteenth-century rural  England.  Especially 
when compared with the available evidence for France and Belgium, English farm servants do 
not  emerge  as  an  important  source  of  material  support  for  their  parents.  When  English 
servants remitted money to their parents it was for a short period only during their first years 
in service. In Belgium and France on the other hand, such relationships extended over longer 
periods and persisted until the servants were in the late twenties.  
Determinants of remittances 
Variations in the scale and frequency of remittances between European country populations 
have been documented in the previous sections of this paper. These differences suggest that 
the relationship between parents and their unmarried adolescent children was quite different. 
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In France and Belgium children in service could be coerced into forms of filial solidarity. In 
England on the other hand, parents could apparently not command that influence over their 
children’s earnings. Research on present-day migrants and remittances can be inspiring to 
identify the causes of these contrasts.  In the literature on the economics of (inter)national 
migration, much attention has been devoted to the motives of migrants who send part of their 
earnings to their countries of origin (for a recent review see Carling 2008). The research by 
Lucas and Stark on the determinants of remittances has been particularly influential in this 
field (Lucas and Stark 1985). Migrants will remit earnings to their parents for a variety of 
reasons. When an arrangement  between the two parties is  considered mutually beneficial, 
remittances can become a regular source of income for the parents. Research on remittances 
in Botswana in late  1970’s has shown that  migrants  will  support their  parents when they 
sustain  a  drop in  household  income as  a  result  from adverse  climatic  conditions  such as 
drought. Rural households can expect help from their migrant children working in an urban 
setting. Children are committed to helping their parents as this ensures that they will inherit 
during a later stage in the life-course (Stark and Lucas 1988, p. 474-478).  Other studies too 
have confirmed that land was an important inducement for migrants to remit money to their 
parents (Hoddinott 1994, p. 469-473). Parents and children are thus able to strike a bargain 
that is mutually beneficial as both parties derive utility from this arrangement. It is important 
to  know what  both  parties  will  ultimately  derive  from such  a  contract.  Historically,  the 
benefits  for  parents  are  fairly  straightforward.  Additional  income  flows  to  the  parental 
household as a result from the remittances of the children. These remittances, either in kind or 
cash,  enable  parents  to  balance  household  income  and  expenditure.  As  the  examples  of 
servants in early nineteenth-century northern France illustrate, remittances from children of 
service could be used to smooth consumption in the households of their parents when prices 
were high.  Also, when servants secure access to the capital goods of their employer (horse 
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and plough teams) they give their parents the opportunity to transport goods at a small cost or 
organize  their  agricultural  production  more  efficiently  (Lambrecht  2003,  p.  254-256). 
Remittances  from servants in  the form of seeds and raw materials  allowed households to 
engage in proto-industrial activities without reliance on commercial credit or loans from flax 
merchants. For the children the benefits are at first sight less straightforward. Assisting their 
parents will result in a lower cash wage or less savings. It is highly unlikely that unmarried 
adolescents  will  sacrifice  their  wages  on the altar  of  filial  assistance  without  any sort  of 
compensation.  Unlike  present-day studies  concerning migrants,  the data  collected  for  this 
paper  cannot  be  cross-referenced  with  other  data  on  the  economic  characteristics  of  the 
households that received remittances. However, if we assume that landownership of parents 
could have been an important influence on remittances, we should find significant differences 
in these regions in terms of access to property rights. In this scenario, migrants would remit 
part of their wages to maintain their future inheritance rights. 
Such a model requires that parents own land at the time when their children work as 
servants. This seems to have been the case in most regions in Belgium and France. In some 
regions in Flanders up to 80-90 per cent of the holdings smaller than 5 hectares were partly 
owned by the peasants. Especially in the regions at some distance from large urban centres 
(for example Alost) peasantries were able to maintain their property rights. In the immediate 
surroundings of  cities,  most  of  the  peasants  with a  holding smaller  than  5 hectares  were 
primarily leaseholders. Nearby Ghent for example, only 20 tot 40 per cent of the peasants 
owned part of their holding (Lambrecht 2012b, p. 19-20 and Vanhaute 1993, p. 193-196). In 
France  too  peasants  still  enjoyed  property  rights.  The  traditional  picture  of  the  gradual 
expropriation of the French peasantries has been adjusted in recent years. Although important 
regional  differences  can  be  observed,  the  eighteenth  century  did  not  witness  the  massive 
expropriation of the small peasant. Small occupier-owned farms were still important during 
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the course of the eighteenth century in many regions (Jollet 1998, p. 99-122; Béaur 2000, p. 
31-33). Moreover, when evaluating the level of peasant ownership of land we should take into 
account  that  land  could  be  distributed  unevenly  across  age  groups.  For  many  peasants 
landlessness  was  a  temporary  stage  (Béaur  1991  and  1998).  Whilst  overall  levels  of 
ownership could be relatively low, there could be important differences according to the stage 
of the life cycle. In Lezennes (northern France) 63 out of 133 households or 47 per cent did 
not possess any land in 1770. This is a relatively high ratio at first sight. A somewhat different 
picture emerges when ownership is linked to the age of the head of the household. In this 
village 60 per cent of the heads of households between the age of 20 and 49 years did not own 
any land. The age group 50 to 79 recorded only 33 per cent landless households. The lowest 
level of land ownership (10 per cent) was recorded among young households (20-29 year). 
The largest concentration of landowners was found in the age group 50 to 59 years as c. 75 
per cent owned land (calculated from Vigneron 2007, p. 203). This example illustrates that 
although levels of peasant ownership might be low throughout society, some age groups could 
be  important  owners  of  land.  In  this  particular  case  we  find  that  three  quarters  of  the 
households that would have had children working as servants owned land and could use these 
property rights as a bargaining tool. 
In terms of peasant landownership eighteenth-century England stands in stark contrast 
to most of continental Europe. Engaging in a comparative study of landownership among the 
lower social groups in rural Europe is seriously hampered by the many different and complex 
legal  property regimes.  It  is  nearly impossible  to  collect  and organize the data  in  such a 
manner  that  cross-country  comparisons  can  be  made.  However,  it  is  evident  from  the 
literature on peasant ownership England that the vast majority of the parents of servants in 
rural England did not enjoy such extensive property rights compared to their  Belgian and 
French counterparts. In the budgets collected by Eden for example nearly all the households 
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list expenditure for house or cottage rent (Eden 1797, III). In the cases where rent was not 
recorded it  is  highly likely that the parish supported this charge.  Research on eighteenth-
century south-east England shows that the vast majority of the labourers were not taxed as 
owners of their cottage (Shaw-Taylor 2004, p. 267-270). Low numbers of owner-occupied 
cottages have also been found in northern England (Hudson 1991, p. 279-280). In many parts 
of eighteenth-century England small owner-occupiers lost their property rights (Allen 1992, p. 
95-101). Few English labouring families were able to acquire property in the course of their 
life-cycle during this period. This absence of property rights and expectation to inherit would 
have greatly influenced the relationship between parents and their children. Parents thus held 
a weak position if they wanted to claim assistance from their children. There was simply no 
guarantee that assistance would be reciprocated or compensated at a later stage in life. English 
servants were not willing to offer assistance and parents could not coerce their children in 
service into filial solidarity. The lack of a mutually beneficial arrangement probably explains 
why intergenerational solidarity was at low ebb (Lis and Vantemsche 1995, p. 31-33; Lis and 
Soly 2009, p. 73; Smith 1996, p. 44). In Belgium and France on the other hand much more 
peasants owned land. Landownership and inheritance rights almost automatically created the 
mutual advantages both parties were looking for to strike a bargain.2 Some contemporary Irish 
observers claimed that there was a causal connection between property and family assistance. 
Account  books  of  eighteenth-century  Irish  farmers  also  frequently  record  transfers  from 
servants to their parents. As in Belgium and France, servants purchased goods and services 
for  their  parents  from  their  cash  wages (Pollock  1995,  p.  29-31).  Witnesses  presenting 
evidence before the parliamentary committee  on poverty in Ireland (1834) confirmed this 
picture of the family as an important source of assistance. One witness stated: ‘Children, but  
2 It should be stressed that differences in inheritance practices could affect remittances. If all children enjoyed  
equal inheritance rights,  parents could command assistance from all their children. If  not  all children could  
inherit, those who will be discriminated based on birth rank or sex will have no incentive to assist their parents  
from their wages earned in service.  However,  parents  did have a powerful  tool  at their disposal to strike a  
bargain with their children that did not inherit land. The dowry system enabled parents to assist children upon 
marriage and repay or compensate the assistance they had provided for them whilst in service.
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more particularly those who are unmarried, evince a strong desire to support their parents,  
and many do so with the wages they earn by service (Selection 1835, p. 159-160). Another 
witness added: ‘The children support their parents, who, on their parts, feel they have a right  
to that support,  especially  when the farm is  held under an old lease,  and at a low rent’ 
(Selection 1835, p. 158).
 
Conclusion
Reconstructing patterns of family assistance and solidarity in the past is a task fraught 
with many difficulties.  Admittedly,  the data and results presented in this article are drawn 
from a wide variety of sources. The lack of uniform data seriously obstructs a systematic 
comparative  study of remittances  during the pre-industrial  period.  On the  other  hand, the 
evidence presented in this article strongly suggests that some significant differences can be 
observed in  various  European regions.  In all  these regions  unmarried  adolescents  left  the 
parental  household during their  mid-teens  to  work as servants in  husbandry.  The specific 
nature of their remuneration did give them the opportunity to remit part of their earnings to 
their parents. In Belgium and France, some parents could indeed rely on frequent remittances 
from their children in service. Although these servants were physically separated from the 
parental household, they nevertheless maintained intense financial and material contacts with 
their family members. Although the institution of life-cycle service looks quite identical in all 
three  regions,  the  role  of  service  could  be  very  different.  This  is  also  a  reminder  that  
household structures could be more or less similar in composition and size, but that internal 
dynamics and power relations between members of these households could vary significantly 
(Humphries 2010, p. 48). 
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In this analysis of remittances property rights and the expectation of an inheritance 
emerge as the most likely explanation for the differences England and Belgium and France. 
This article has contrasted Belgium and France with England. Naturally, regional differences 
within countries will have existed. It should be stressed that not all servants in France and 
Belgium remitted to their parents. In regions where property rights of the peasantries were 
strong it is highly likely the family would have emerged as an important source of welfare, 
also  in  England.  To  some  extent,  the  national  viewpoint  adopted  in  this  article  obscures 
regional similarities in these three countries.
Land  emerged  out  of  this  research  as  the  proverbial  common  ground  between 
generations and acted as a security for all parties. In the absence of land and inheritance, 
intergenerational solidarity was much more difficult to organize (Sabean 1990, p. 35). These 
differences in the level and frequency of remittances are confirmed by research on family 
welfare during other stages in the life-cycle. Most of the elderly in England were unable to 
negotiate  care  from  their  relatives  and  were  relieved  by  collective  welfare  institutions. 
Numerous studies have illustrated that the vast majority of elderly labourers depended mainly 
on parish support for their survival (see Thomson 1984; Smith 1998; Ottaway 1998). In many 
Belgian  and French regions  on the other  hand,  care  during old  age was provided by the 
family. In old age, peasant-owners in France and Belgium exchanged their property rights for 
structural assistance in the form of food, housing or a pension (for Belgium see Wilssens 
1992, p. 121-133; for France see Poitrineau 1981 and Desaive 2005 among the numerous 
studies). These differences in family care during old age can also be explained by differences 
in property rights. Owning land was the most powerful instrument peasants had to coerce their 
children into filial solidarity. It appears that households with property rights could command 
assistance from their heirs at different stages in their life as both before and after marriage 
children  assisted  their  parents.  Servants  and  adolescents  in  rural  England  were  not 
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individualist nor were their Belgian and French counterparts altruistic. The relationship with 
their parents was in both cases based on rational calculation and careful balancing of their 
different interests. Material interests, much more than emotions, determined the extent and 
level of solidarity between generations.
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Fuel (coal) 0.3 1.1
Transport 0.6 0
*  shirts  for  men  and  aprons  for  women.   Source:  State  Archives  Ghent,  Old  Archives  
Lembeke, nr. 292.
Table  2:  Annual  compensation  for  family  members  of  French  soldiers,  1792-1794 
(livres/year).
1792 1793 1794
Father (60 +) 40 100 100
Father (70 +) 60 100 100
Mother (60 +) 40 100 100
Mother (70 +) 60 100 100
Orphaned  brother/ 
sister (- 12)
/ 50 100
Source: Gross 2000, p. 376-384 and Bertaud 1990, p. 251-274.
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Elverdinge 800 74 60 9494 1000 10.53
Noordschote 500 57 59 7901 732.3 9.27
Vlamertinge 846 65 63 8813 729.8 8.28
Zuidschote 311 42 29 5156 392.6 7.61
Reningelst 1072 86 77 11368 848.7 7.47
Watou 1487 98 93 13196 928.5 7.04
Loker 485 34 25 4244 262.4 6.18
Woesten 324 22 18 2830 61 2.16
Total 478 424 63002 4955.3
Weighed average 7.87
Sources: a  data from 1697 in Dalle 1953-1954, p. 34; b see Appendix 1; c State Archives 
Bruges, Acht Parochies, nr. 258.
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Appendix 1:  Annual wages of servants in the rural district of Furnes, 1701 (£. parisis.).
Wage Male Female
n % N %
0-14 5 0.8 14 3
15-29 22 3.32 67 14.8
30-44 52 7.85 137 30.3
45-59 67 10.12 103 22.8
60-74 108 16.31 113 25
75-89 62 9.37 14 3.1
90-104 94 14.2 4 0.9
105-119 38 5.7 0 0
120-134 132 19.9 0 0
135-164 65 9.8 0 0
> 165 17 2.6 0 0




Female/male wage rate 50.55 %
Sources: City Archives Furnes, Oud Archief, nr. 914.
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